The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict by Swanson, Lesley
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-22-2010
The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International
Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian
Cyber Conflict
Lesley Swanson
Loyola Law School Los Angeles
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 303 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol32/iss2/5
THE ERA OF CYBER WARFARE:
APPLYING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW TO THE 2008
RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CYBER
CONFLICT
Lesley Swanson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In early August 2008, a full-scale war broke out between
Russia and Georgia over the disputed territory of South Ossetia, a
pro-Russian autonomous region of Georgia.' Bombs were dropped
throughout the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, with Russian bombers
targeting Georgia's economic infrastructure, including the
country's largest Black Sea port, Poti, and the main road
connecting the southern part of Georgia with the East.2 In the two
months leading up to this conflict, Georgia's Internet
infrastructure was also attacked and major Georgian website
servers were brought down, hindering communication and causing
confusion throughout the country.' The kind of attacks used is
known as distributed denial of service attacks.4 They are triggered
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1. Elene Gotsadze, Fighting with Russia Spreads to Cities Across Georgia, CNN.COM,
Aug. 8, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/08/georgia.ossetial
index.html#cnnSTCText.
2. Id.
3. Kim Hart, Longtime Battle Lines are Recast in Russia and Georgia's Cyberwar,
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2008, at Dl.
4. Bruce Etling, Cyber Warfare Precedes Georgian-Russian Hostilities, Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, Internet & Democracy Blog, Aug.
11, 2008, http://blogs.law.harvard.edulidblog/2008/08/11/cyber-warfare-preceds-georgian-
russian-hostilities/.
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when computers in a network are simultaneously ordered to
bombard a website with millions of requests, which then overload
the website server and cause it to shut down.' These cyber attacks
mainly hindered the Georgian government's ability to
communicate with its citizens, as well as other nations, both before
and during the physical invasion by Russia.6 Official Georgian
websites, including those for the President's office, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense were disabled, at
least temporarily.! Even after a cease-fire between the nations was
ordered shortly after the physical invasion by Russia, major
Georgian servers remained inoperable. The Russian-Georgian
cyber conflict, which was perhaps the first time that cyber attacks
were used alongside conventional military action,9 illustrates the
havoc that can spread on the digital battlefield and re-energizes
the debate over whether the laws of war apply to this new kind of
warfare.
Whether the world is prepared or not, cyber weapons are
becoming a staple of modern war. Combat no longer consists
solely of physical attacks or invasions among nations with distinct
military units. This new kind of warfare uses a target nation's own
technology against it, in order to bring down vital infrastructure.10
As Internet and computer technology continues to develop, so too
will the methods and means of warfare. Moreover, given the low
cost and wide availability of computers, as well as the ability to
operate them anonymously, cyber attacks make for an attractive
method of warfare. 1. In recent years, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of cyber attacks, both by nations and by
12non-state actors.
5. Hart, supra note 3, at D1.
6. Id.
7. Etling, supra note 4.
8. Hart, supra note 3, at D1.
9. Siobhan Gorman, Cyberattacks on Georgian Web Sites are Reigniting a
Washington Debate, WALL STREET J., Aug. 14,2008, at A6.
10. Kit Lavell, Defending America in the 21st Century: The Times, the Technology and
the Military are Changing, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 16, 2003.
11. see CLAY WILSON, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND
CYBERWAR: CAPABILITIES AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES, at 10 (Cong. Research Serv.
[CRS] Report RL 31787, 2007), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf.
12. See Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure
in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 403,404-05 (2007).-
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As modern society increasingly relies on global and domestic
information structures, these structures tend to become targets
during war and other hostilities. As described in a recent news
article, a survey of the seventy largest Internet operators in North
America, South America, Europe, and Asia found that malicious
computer attacks were rising sharply and growing more
sophisticated. Additionally, these attacks are being used not only
in political conflict, but also in blackmail schemes and for the
purpose of malicious mischief.14 While concerted online attacks
have been a threat for years, the Russian-Georgian cyber conflict
of 2008 illustrates how states are more forcefully engaging in cyber
attacks as a way to weaken opponents' critical infrastructures-
systems and assets vital to national security, economic security,
and public health and safety."
Currently, there is no provision in international humanitarian
law (IHL)16 or customary international law (CIL)" that explicitly
outlaws cyber warfare or computer network attacks, either carried
out independently or during times of war. This is understandable
since the law of war dates back to the nineteenth century and has
not yet been updated for applicability in the Information Age.'
Nonetheless, some legal restraints do apply.
This article argues that existing IHL principles should be used
to analyze the legality of cyber attacks. Part II of this article
discusses the increasing use of cyber warfare in international
conflict. Part III of this article explains that IHL principles apply
whenever cyber attacks, ascribed to a state, are more than simply
sporadic in nature and are intended to cause, or will foreseeably
cause, injury, death, damage, or destruction. On the other hand,
IHL most likely does not apply in the absence of those
13. John Markoff, Internet Attacks Seen as More Potent and Complex, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/technology/10iht-
10attacks.17670804.html?_r=1.
14. Id.
15. See Condron, supra note 12, at 406.
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing international humanitarian law, specifically the
branch of international law that governs armed conflict).
17. Customary international law refers to aspects of international law that derive
from custom and is reflected in state practice. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102 (1986).
18. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 1 (2nd ed. 1998) (discussing how the
principles of IHL have evolved to their present understanding).
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consequences. Part IV applies IHL principles to the 2008 Russian-
Georgian cyber conflict. Given the complexities and novelties
involved in this new kind of warfare, however, Part V further
proposes that the international community and powerful states
should seek to supplement existing IHL principles with more
explicit and transparent policies that best correspond to modern
Internet technology and address the ways in which this technology
can legally be used to carry out cyber attacks.
In sum, this article addresses the use of cyber or computer
network attacks and considers how jus in bello, or the body of law
concerned with what is permissible during hostilities, governs such
conflict.19 This article ultimately seeks to answer the question:
"Does a cyber attack constitute an act of war such that
international humanitarian law principles apply and govern its
use?"
II. RECENT CYBER ATTACKS ILLUSTRATE How STATES ARE
MORE FORCEFULLY ENGAGING IN CYBER WARFARE AS A MEANS
TO WEAKEN OPPONENTS' CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
The Internet has emerged as a powerful tool for government
functions, information, and mobilization, as well as commerce and
social networking.2 It has even become a way to disseminate
ideological and political messages.2 1 With the increase in utilization
of the Internet for more than just economic and social functions,
the international community must be aware that it can also serve
as a tool for conducting operations that lead to confusion,
destruction, and even death. Examples of cyber attacks against
nations in recent history underscore the potential implications in
using the Internet as a weapon in war, as well as how there is now
clear international recognition of cyberspace as a battlefield. This
is evidenced by the fact that information warfare systems are
currently being developed and used by at least 120 countries,
including Peru, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Croatia, Vietnam,
and Russia.22 In order to fully understand cyber attacks and their
19. See id. at 1-2 (describing the difference between jus ad bellum and jus in bello).
20. K.A. Taipale, Seeking Symmetry on the Information Front: Confronting Global
Jihad on the Internet, 16 Nat'1 Strategy F. Rev., Summer 2007, at 3.
21. Id.
22. Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch
- The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 293, 297-98 (2008) (quoting John
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implications, one must first define cyber warfare and its related
concepts.
A. What is Cyber Warfare?
The U.S. Army's Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism
Handbook defines cyber attack as: "The premeditated use of
disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers
and/or networks, with the intention to cause harm or to further
social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives. Or to
intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives."23 Such
harm could be inflicted on the computer network, as well as to
physical facilities and persons. Cyber attacks are distinct from
cyber crimes, which are governed by national criminal statutes and
include such acts as identity theft and Internet fraud." Cyber
attacks, unlike cyber crimes, involve "an aggressive act on the part
of one adversary-whether an individual, a competing
organization or a rival government-against another in an ongoing
struggle for hegemony in the marketplace or the political arena."
In order to fully comprehend what is meant by cyber warfare,
the concept of "cyberspace" should also be explored. Essentially,
cyberspace is the sum of electronic networks including, but not
limited to, the Internet, where various information operations
26occur.
Information warfare, on the other hand, is narrower than
information operations and is defined as "information operations
conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote
Christensen, Bracing for Guerrilla Warfare in Cyberspace: 'There are Lots of
Opportunities; That's Very Scary', CNN.COM, Apr. 6, 1999,
http://www.cnn.com/TECHI/specials/hackers/cyberterror/).
23. U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, DCSINT HANDBOOK No. 1.02,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM, at VII-2 (2006).
24. Solce, supra note 22, at 300-01.
25. Richard W. Aldrich, The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare,
10 AIRPOWER J. 99, 101 (Fall 1996).
26. See Michael A. Sinks, Cyber Warfare and International Law 3 (Apr. 2008)
(unpublished research paper, Air University, Air Command and Staff College), available
at https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=bee99f3-fc56-4ccb-
8dfe-670c0822a153&mode =user&action=researchproject&objectid= 1120f215-38a9-4829-
bb7a-33de2e42ecl2 (noting that the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations
defines cyberspace as "a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and
associated physical infrastructure").
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specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries."2 1
Information warfare has been conducted since at least the sixth
century BC.28 Even before the rise of cyberspace, warring parties
used electronic deception and disruption as essential ingredients of
"real war." For instance, the U.S. Air Force has had information
warfare squadrons since the 1980s, which were used successfully
during the first Gulf War.29 Information operations, is an evolving
discipline within many nations' militaries.
Cyber warfare' is simply the latest form of information
warfare, 30 and can include computer network attacks (CNA),
which consist of "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
information resident in computers or computer networks, or the
computers and networks themselves."3' A CNA essentially
involves the "hacking" of another nation's computer network, but
uses data systems, as opposed to physical weapons, to execute the
32attack.
B. Recent Cyber Attacks and the Resulting Damage
Cyber attacks that have taken place in the past few years
illustrate how states are utilizing modern technology and more
forcefully engaging in information warfare to weaken opponents'
critical infrastructures. There is significant international concern
that hostile foreign governments could preemptively launch
computer-based attacks on integral national or regional systems,
such as those supporting energy distribution, telecommunications,
27. Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello,
846 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 365, 366 (June 2002) [hereinafter Wired Warfare]
(quoting JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02 203 (2001)).
28. See generally SUN TzU, THE ART OF WAR (John Minford trans., Penguin Books
2003) (6th cent. B.C.) (a collection of military strategic reflections from the sixth century
BC).
29. See Mark Thompson & Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21,
1995, at 40, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983318,00.html.
30. See Sinks, supra note 26, at 5.
31. Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 367 (quoting JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS,
JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02 203 (2001)).
32. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, AN ASSESSMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 5 (May 1999). See also
Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 367 (describing the specificity of a computer network
attack in contrast to other types of attacks).
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and financial services." Since everything from transportation to
commodity supply to health care to. public safety to military
operations now relies on computer information systems, 34 cyber
attacks have the potential to cause far greater damage than
conventional weapons.
Recent publicly-known cyber attacks include attacks on
Lithuanian commercial and government websites in June 2008,
attacks on Estonian government websites in 2007, an e-mail breach
in the Pentagon in June 2007, and hacks into Pakistan's state-
owned telephone company's website in January 2003." Around
August 2008, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
temporarily disabled official Georgian websites, including those
for the President's office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
Ministry of Defense, and led to communication problems
throughout the country." Even more recently, it has been
discovered that Chinese hackers have breached the White House
computer networks on numerous occasions, obtaining e-mail
communication exchanged among government officials.
Additionally, the damage caused by many of these attacks
included injury, death, and property damage. In perhaps the most
extreme example, the 2007 attacks on Estonian websites caused
more than just confusion for the nation's population. At the time
of these attacks, Estonia had essentially instituted an "e-
government" where many aspects of the government were carried
33. See Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Attacks Against
Information Systems, at 1-3, COM (2002) 173 final (Apr. 19, 2002).
34. Id.
35. Brian Prince, Cyber-Attacks Gaining Acceptance as Another Weapon in War,
EWEEK.coM, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.eweek.com/cla/Security/A-Year-of-
CyberAttacks-Georgia-Not-First-and-Wont-be-Last-to-Fall-Victim-to-Hackers
(Lithuanian, Estonian, and the Pentagon); Ahmad Naeem Khan, Pakistan Prepares Cyber
Terrorism Offensive, GREATREPORTER.COM, May 13, 2003,
http://greatreporter.com/mambo/content/view/70/15/ (Pakistan). See also Scott J.
Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International
Law, 3 (2003) (unpublished student comment available at
http://works.bepress.comlscott-shackelford/5) (describing the computer attacks on Estonia
and the resulting damage).
36. See Etling, supra note 4.
37. See Demetri Sevastopulo, Chinese Hack into White House Network, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2931c542-ac35-lldd-bf7l-
000077b07658.html.
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38out online. In addition to bringing down many of Estonia's
critical government and commercial websites, the cyber attacks
also caused the emergency phone number used for calling
ambulances and the fire service to be unavailable for more than
one hour.39 As a result, widespread social unrest and rioting left
150 people injured and one Russian national dead.40 In contrast,
the Lithuanian attacks involved the defacement of government
and commercial websites with anti-Lithuanian rhetoric and
41communist symbols. The government, however, was able to
prepare sufficient defenses to these attacks.42 These two examples
demonstrate that the damage from a cyber attack can often be
unpredictable.
C. The Methods Used in Carrying Out a Cyber Attack
Cyber weapons are not like traditional weapons of warfare.
Individuals or nations that use cyber weapons may choose from a
variety of options, including syntactic,. semantic, and mixed
43weapons. Syntactic weapons, which target a computer's operating
system, include malicious code, such as viruses, worms, Trojan
44Horses, DDoS, and spyware. Through DDoS attacks, like those
used against Georgia, the cyber attacker shuts down a website by
bombarding it with large amounts of traffic.45 Conversely, semantic
weapons target "the accuracy of information to which the
computer user has access."4 6 In other words, a semantic attack
consists of altering information that enters the computer's system
38. Shackelford, supra note 35, at 3 (citing Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the
Most Wired Country in Europe, WIRED MAGAZINE, Aug. 21, 2007).
39. Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The
Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1427, 1429 (2008).
40. Shackelford, supra note 35, at 3 (citilig Putin Warns Against Belittling War Effort,
RADIO FREE EUROPE, May 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076356.html).
41. Prince, supra note 35.
42. Id.
43. See Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An
Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POI'Y 1, 27-42 (2002)
(discussing the types of attacks on computer systems).
44. Id. at 27; Solce, supra note 22, at 305.
45. Brenner & Goodman, supra note 43, at 29.
46. Solce, supra note 22, at 305 (quoting Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the
Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51
NAVAL L. REV. 132, 144 (2005)).
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in order to produce errors without the user's knowledge.4 7 Mixed
or blended weapons combine syntactic and semantic weapons to
attack both information and the computer's operating system,
resulting in a more sophisticated attack.4 ' An example of a mixed
weapon is a "bot network," which is a proliferation of "bots,"
surreptitiously planted on innocent third-party computers. Bots
are remote-controlled computer programs that infect other
computers. A hacker who controls the bots can spy, copy, and
transmit sensitive data, as well as organize the bots in a swarm
49attack against targeted computers.
Attacked computers or networks are systems that have been
infected with malicious software through the use of these weapons,
and that are then brought under the control of an attacker in a
remote location.o Infected devices continually listen for
commands from the attacker and act upon them, with the intention
of compromising the opponent's security or critical
infrastructure.
The Internet was originally a network of computers linked to
52the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1960s and 1970s. As the
computer networks of universities and private research facilities
merged through the development of hypertext, a global network
with benefits to both military and civilian sectors was created."
The new technology, however, has also created vulnerabilities for
nations that rely heavily on the Internet, especially in their military
and governmental infrastructures. This has created an
opportunity for warring parties to exploit network vulnerabilities
with various cyber weapons and attacks.
47. Brenner & Goodman, supra note 43, at 31.
48. Id. at 39.
49. See Solce, supra note 22, at 305.
50. See Steve Crocker, Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 4 (June 25, 2007)
(unpublished presentation at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, available at
http://www.icann.org/presentations/ssac-la-estonia-ddos-attacks-25junO7.pdf).
51. Id. at 10-11.
52. See generally Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet (1997),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edulviewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.102.3909&rep=repl&type=pdf
(reviewing the history of the Internet).
53. James P. Terry, Book Review, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 491, 492 (1999)
(reviewing W. GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE (1999)). See
generally Leiner et al., supra note 52 (reviewing the history of the Internet).
54. Terry, supra note 53, at 492.
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III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW SHOULD GOVERN THE
LEGALITY OF CYBER ATTACKS WHEN SUCH ATTACKS
CONSTITUTE ARMED CONFLICT
Information gathering and disruption have always been major
tools of war. Disrupting an enemy's communications networks
may even have greater strategic value than destroying its arsenals
or supply lines. Indeed, some information warfare methods are
considered so unsavory as to be prohibited by the laws of war.
While a cyber attack is not truly kinetic or physical in nature like
traditional forms of weaponry, a cyber attack may still lead to
major physical destruction and even death." Therefore, because of
these possible consequences, a cyber attack could constitute an
armed conflict, such that IHL governs, if certain criteria are met.
The threshold question is under what circumstances can a cyber
attack be deemed an armed conflict, such that IHL applies. This is
an important question because its answer provides guidance to
nations on how they can respond to such attacks in a way that is
consistent with international legal norms.
A. International Humanitarian Law Background
IHL is the branch of public international law that "seeks to
moderate the conduct of armed conflict and to mitigate the
suffering which it causes." It is one of two principle divisions of
the laws of war and is termed jus in bello, or the "law in war."
The other division is known as jus ad bellum, or the "law.to war,"
58which governs the legality of resorting to armed force. The terms
"law of war" and "law of armed conflict" are synonymous.
Jus in bello traditionally involves both Geneva and Hague
law. Geneva law rests on the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the two 1977 Additional Protocols. 9 These treaties are particularly
concerned with the protection of the victims of armed conflict,
with Additional Protocol I focusing on the means and methods of
warfare. Conversely, Hague law refers to the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions, and is mainly concerned with methods and means of
warfare, tactics, and the general conduct of hostilities. In modem
55. See supra Part II.B.
56. MCCOUBREY, supra note 18, at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 32:303312
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usage, IHL is taken to comprise jus in bello in both its Geneva and
60Hague dimensions.
B. The Applicability of IHL to Cyber Attacks
The law of armed conflict, as a part of international law, is
binding on states, yet a violation may also involve the prosecution
of individuals for war crimes." Some have argued that IHL cannot
govern cyber attacks because there is nothing physical or kinetic
62about such operations. In other words, a CNA is not an armed
conflict in the true sense of the phrase and, therefore, such an
attack falls outside of the scope of IHL. Article 2, which is
common to all four of the Geneva Conventions, provides that "[i]n
addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them."6 ' Additional
Protocol I also relies on this same "armed conflict" language.
Article 1(3) of Additional Protocol I states that "[t]his Protocol,
which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for
the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred
to in Article 2 common to those Conventions."6 Thus, in order for
IHL to govern a cyber attack, such an attack must in fact
constitute an armed conflict.
Nevertheless, commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and
their subsequent Additional Protocols have posited that "armed
conflict" can be viewed in a fairly expansive way. Armed conflict
has been defined as "any difference arising between States and
leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces."66 A
60. Id.
61. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
3 (2004).
62. See Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 368-69 (describing the arguments against the
applicability of IHL to computer network attacks).
63. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art.2, Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 31.
64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(3), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S
3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
65. See UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 61, at 29; Wired Warfare, supra note
27, at 372-73.
66. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 61, at 29.
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dispute resulting in the engagement of armed forces, however,
cannot be the sole criterion. For example, the replacement of
border police with soldiers or an accidental border incursion by
members of the armed forces would not amount to an armed
67conflict. Thus, some degree of intensity and duration must be
61considered, as underlying principles of IHL make clear. IHL is
founded upon the idea that victims of armed conflict, including
personnel who have been rendered hors de combat,6 9 are entitled
to protection.0 This protection is "usually framed in terms of
injury, death, or in the case of property, damage or destruction.""
Therefore, fundamental principles of IHL provide that armed
conflict occurs when a group takes measures that injure, kill,
damage, or destroy,72 thereby narrowing the definition of armed
conflict and limiting its applicability.
From the above discussion, it logically follows that a cyber
attack may constitute armed conflict, even though the use of a
computer as a weapon is not a traditional or physical method of
warfare, as long as certain consequences arise. While cyber attacks
employ modern technology not conceived of during the drafting of
the Geneva Conventions, the language of Additional Protocol I,
and in particular Article 36, indicate that the drafters anticipated
the application of the rules to new developments in warfare
methods. The law of armed conflict must change and develop to
account for new humanitarian imperatives that may be generated
67. See id.
68. See Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 372.
69. According to Additional Protocol I, art. 41(1) and (2), a person is hors de combat
if "he is in the power of an adverse party; he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or
he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness,
and therefore is incapable of defending himself . . . ." Additional Protocol I, supra note 64,
1125 U.N.T.S. at 22.
70. MCCOUBREY, supra note 18, at 1.
71. Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 373.
72. Id.
73. KNUT DORMANN, APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS 2 (2004), . available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/68LG92/$File/ApplicabilityoflHLtoCNA
.pdf [hereinafter APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER
NETWORK ATTACKS]. Article 36 provides: "In the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is
under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law
applicable to the High Contracting Party." Additional Protocol 1 supra note 64, 1125
U.N.T.S. at 21.
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by the evolution in the conduct of armed conflict itself."4 In fact,
IHL anticipates technological change. For example, the "Martens
Clause" found in the Preamble to the Hague Convention IV of
1907 "asserts that even in cases not explicitly covered by specific
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection
and authority of principles of international law derived from
established custom, principles of humanity, and from the dictates
of public conscience."7 5 In other words, attacks should essentially
be judged largely by their effects, rather than by how they are
employed.16
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides
important guidance in assessing the applicability of IHL to cyber
attacks. Additional Protocol I codifies many existing principles of
CIL and introduces important new treaty provisions relating to
international armed conflict." Some provisions of Additional
Protocol I are controversial such that they are said to only bind
state parties to the treaty and, thus, they do not reflect customary
law. Nevertheless, the significance of Additional Protocol I, as it
relates to cyber warfare specifically and jus in bello generally, is
that it supplements the original Geneva Conventions as they apply
to civilians in an armed conflict as well as to the prohibited
79methods of warfare in situations of conflict.
A key aspect of Additional Protocol I is the "doctrine of
unnecessary suffering," which is fundamental to jus in bello in
general.so Article 35 states: "In any armed conflict, the right of the
Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is
not unlimited. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury and unnecessary suffering.",8 This principle serves to place
some limits on the barbarity and the range of means and weapons
74. MCCOUBREY, supra note 18, at 32.
75. LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1998), available at http://www.dodccrp.org/files/
Greenberg Law.pdf; see also UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 61, at 23-24
(discussing how the Martens Clause incorporates the principle of humanity).
76. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 75, at 11.
77. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 61, at 15.
78. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1170, 1176-86 (6th ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008).
79. Id. at 1169.
80. MCCOUBREY, supra note 18, at 212.
81. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21.
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that are available in today's modern society. Furthermore,
Additional Protocol I was the first treaty to set out specifically the
principle of proportionality, which requires that the losses
resulting from military action should not be excessive in relation to
82the expected military advantage. Proportionality closely relates
to the concept of indiscriminate attacks. Article 51(5)(b) describes
an indiscriminate attack as one that "may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.", 3 These principles are important. to cyber warfare
because they require that the attacker refrain from attacks that
may be expected to cause excessive collateral damage.84
Similar to nuclear weapons, cyber weapons are arguably sui
generis or, in other words, they are unique in their characteristics
85and therefore should be governed by a unique set of laws.
Nevertheless, cyber weapons, just like nuclear weapons, are
weapons that result in consequences similar to that of traditional
weapons. Accordingly, IHL principles, such as the concept of
unnecessary suffering and proportionality, still have relevance in
the case of a cyber attack. Often, the question simply will be: To
what extent do these principles apply? While some uncertainties
remain, what is clear from this discussion is that an "armed
conflict" occurs when an actor takes measures that injure, kill,
86damage, or destroy, regardless of the weapon used.
Scholars agree that an armed conflict exists and IHL governs
once kinetic weapons are used in combination with CNAs. The
question becomes more difficult when computer networks conduct
the first or only hostile acts. The key in assessing such conduct,
however, is the effects or consequences of the attacks. Based on
this framework, IHL applies whenever cyber attacks, ascribed to a
82. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 61, at 25. See also Olivera.Medenica,
Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by Principles of
Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 360-61 (2001) (discussing the
principle of proportionality and its incorporation into Additional Protocol I).
83. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
84. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 61, at 26.
85. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 18, at 244.
86. See Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 373.
87. See APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER
NETWORK ATTACKS, supra note 73, at 2.
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state, are more than simply sporadic in nature and are intended to,
and actually do, cause injury, death damage, or destruction or
such consequences are foreseeable. Other scholars agree that
cyber attacks that lead to the subversion of political, economic,
and non-military information bearing on a nation's capabilities
89may also implicate international law principles. This surely will
be the case, even if cyber attacks are the only means of force used,
as long as the particular consequences mentioned above result. On
the other hand, IHL would probably not pertain where the actual,
foreseeable, or intended consequences do not include injury,
death, damage, or destruction..
The reason why a consequence-based approach is necessary
in analyzing the application of IHL to cyber attacks is because
once armed conflict has commenced, the means by which injury,
death, damage, or destruction are produced has no bearing on the
legality of that conduct. 90 Thus, a lone cyber attack is subject to
IHL if these particular consequences result.
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I mandates that parties to a
conflict direct their operations against military objectives. Thus,
targeting a military object, such as military air traffic control
system, would be permissible. Since it is often the case that a CNA
would target not purely military objectives, the next question is
whether targeting civilian computer networks or systems are
permissible. Based on the language of Article 48, however, the
prohibition is not so much on targeting non-military objectives as
it is on attacking them through acts of violence. 92 Consequently,
IHL would prohibit cyber attacks directed against non-military
objectives that are intended to, or would foreseeably, cause injury,
death, destruction, or damage.93 On the other hand, an attack
targeting a non-military objective that is not likely to result in the
aforementioned consequences would be permissible. 94
88. See id. at 3; Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 374.
89. See Terry, supra note 53, at 491-92 (stating that the author of the reviewed book
argues that these attacks may well constitute an unlawful use of force under international
humanitarian law).
90. Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 375.
91. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25.
92. Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 376.
93. Id. at 378.
-94. Id.
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IV. THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CYBER CONFLICT ILLUSTRATES THE
COMPLEXITIES IN APPLYING IHL TO CYBER ATrACKS
Since IHL may apply to cyber warfare in certain situations
depending on the results of an attack, it is not necessary to create a
completely new set of laws or form a new treaty to apply solely to
cyber attacks. Nevertheless, applying IHL to the 2008 cyber
conflict involving Russia and Georgia illustrates the difficulties in
being able to implement fully IHL in these instances and to
articulate concretely the reactions to such attacks. The most
notable difficulties involve attributing responsibility for the attacks
and determining the difference between military objectives and
non-military objectives in the context of targeted websites and
computer systems.
A. Was Russia Responsible for the Attacks on Georgian Websites?
Both Russia and Georgia are state parties to Additional
Protocol I, which pertains to the protection of victims of
international armed conflict. Thus, as parties to the treaty, its
provisions bind them, including the duty before carrying out an
attack to "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be
attacked are ... military objectives."9 6 Even for states not a party
to the Protocol, customary law would still require their forces to
attack only military objectives, meaning that these targets must be
distinguished from civilian objectives.97 The Institute of
International Law even points out that existing international law
prohibits the use of all weapons that, by their nature, affect
indiscriminately both military and non-military objectives.9 8
Additional Protocol I further requires that in the time of
armed conflict, states must ensure that legal advisers are available,
when necessary, to counsel military commanders regarding the
application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol
95. The list of state parties to* Additional Protocol I is also located at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P.
96. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
97. See A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, No. 837 .INT'L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 165 (Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/webleng/
site engO. nsf/html/57JQCU.
98. The Distinction Between Military Objectives and Non-military Objectives in
General and Particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, Inst.
of Int'l L. 2 (Sept. 9, 1969), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebPrint/445-
FULL?OpenDocument.
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I.9 9 Therefore, both Russia and Georgia had an obligation to
ensure that they were following IHL in their physical altercation in
August 2008. Nevertheless, given the relatively small amount of
equipment required to launch a cyber attack and the pervasiveness
of the Internet, ascertaining whether Russia, as opposed to non-
state actors, was responsible for the attacks on Georgian websites,
such that legal implications are created, is extremely difficult.
Conversely, 'actually engaging in cyber war or bombarding a
website is relatively simple. As demonstrated by one reporter, all
one needs to do is save a copy of a certain Georgian web page to
one's hard drive and then open it on the computer's browser. Once
accessed, the page will load thumb-nailed versions of a dozen key
Georgian websites in a single window. All the cyber "soldier" must
do is set the page to update automatically every three to five
seconds and from then on the browser will continue to send
thousands of queries to the most important Georgian websites,
helping to overload them and bring them down. This is the
simple way of bringing down a website, but there are more
sophisticated and creative options, including obtaining certain
kinds of software to carry out DDoS attacks."'
The evidence is currently not clear whether Russia was
involved in the shutdown of Georgian websites or whether the
102attacks can be attributed to non-state actors. Jose Nazario, an
Internet security specialist, believes that non-state actors likely
caused the attacks on Georgian websites, because there is a history
of the kind of botnet attacks involved previously attacking
commercial or non-political targets.' Cyber attacks are often
difficult to trace and it can take several months to reach definitive
answers. For example, in 1998 an investigation by U.S. intelligence
99. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 41.
100. Evgney Morozov, An Army of Ones and Zeroes, SLATE, Aug. 14, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2197514/?from=rss.
101. Id.
102. Compare Jon Swaine, Georgia: Russia "Conducting Cyber War," THE
TELEGRAPH (UK), Aug. 11, 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/ 2539157/Georgia-Russia-
conducting-cyber-war.html (discussing the relationship of the Russian Business Network
and the Russian Government), with PBS News Hour (PBS television broadcast Aug. 13,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/Europe/july-
dec08/cyberwar_08-13.html) (discussing the fact that the attacks were likely carried out by
non-state actors).
103. PBS News Hour, supra note 102.
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officials initially linked Iraq to a series of breaches of the
Department of Defense computers. The real suspects ended up
being two teenagers in Northern California.
Project Grey Goose, an open-source initiative launched on
August 22, 2008, has examined the Russian-Georgian cyber war
and has drawn conclusions regarding the Russian government's
involvement in the attacks.'os The group based its conclusion on
data collected from two Russian hacker forums, www.xakep.ru and
www.stopgeorgian.ru, along with network log files detailing 29,000
status events indicating the up/down status of 149 Georgian
websites. o0 In its Phase I Report issued on October 17, 2008,
Project Grey Goose concluded that "the Russian- government will
likely continue its practice of distancing itself from the Russian
nationalistic hacker community thus gaining deniability while
passively supporting and enjoying the strategic benefits of their
actions."' 07 The group was unable to find any direct link to Russian
state organizations guiding the attacks, but maintained that there
is. significant historical evidence that Russian officials endorse
108cyber warfare initiated by their country's hacker community. For
example, . General Vladislav Sherstyuk, the current Russian
Federation Security Council Deputy Secretary and former Deputy
Director of the Federal Agency for Government Communications
and Information, stated in 2002 that "strike-capable militar
computer viruses" would be used in the cyber battlefield.
Furthermore, a letter from a Russian Duma member stated in
March 2006: "In the very near future many conflicts will not take
place on the open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the
Internet, fought with the aid of information soldiers, that is
hackers."' 10
As Project Grey Goose noted, it is unreasonable to conclude
that there is no connection between Russian hackers and the
104. Christopher Beam, Cyberspace Invaders: Is a Cyber-Attack an Act of War?,
SLATE, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.slate.comlid/2204123.
105. RuSSIA/GEORGIA CYBER WAR - FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS, PROJECT GREY
GOOSE: PHASE I REPORT, at 6-8 (Oct. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/6967393/Project-Grey-Goose-Phase-I-Report.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 7.
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Russian government. There has been consistent support from
members of the Russian government and essentially an implied
i p111consent in its refusal to intervene or stop the hackers' attacks.' If
indeed the Russian government or persons acting on behalf of the
Russian government were responsible for the attacks on Georgian
sites, then the only question as to the applicability of IHL would
be whether such attacks resulted in death, damage, destruction, or
injury.
Besides the possibility of ordinary Russian citizens being
responsible for the attacks, analysts have also accused the Russian
Business Network (RBN), a network of criminal hackers with
close links to the Russian mafia and government, of the Georgian
attacks.11 Visits to Georgian government websites seemingly were
re-routed through servers in Russia and Turkey where the traffic
was blocked. According to experts, these servers are widely known
to be under the control of the RBN and influenced by the Russian
113government. If the RBN were acting on behalf of the Russian
114government, then this would constitute conduct by a state.
If the actors were civilians, the problem in applying IHL
becomes more complex. Even civilians or non-state actors who
attempt to neutralize an enemy network, via a CNA that results in
the aforementioned consequences, could be considered as direct
participants in hostilities for purposes of Geneva law."' This would
mean that these civilians are illeal combatants and, therefore, not
immune from retaliatory attack. 1 Civilians could also be subject
111. Id. at 8. See also THE EVOLVING STATE OF CYBER WARFARE, PROJECT GREY
GOOSE PHASE II REPORT Chap. 3 (Mar. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/13442963/Project-Grey-Goose-Phase-II-Report (stating that
there is new evidence pointing to how the Russian government pays leaders of Russian
youth organizations to engage in information operations to silence or suppress opposition
groups).
112. Swaine, supra note 102.
113. Id. See also Peter Warren, Hunt for Russia's Web Criminals, THE GUARDIAN
(UK), Nov. 15, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/nov/15/news.crime
(stating that the RBN has ties to a well-known government politician).
114. APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER NETWORK
ATTACKS, supra note 73, at 3.
115. see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 9-10 (2003)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW].
116. Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 383-84.
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to criminal prosecution under domestic law for the mere fact of
taking part in hostilities.
If the actors who carried out the cyber attacks against
Georgia were members of Russia's armed. forces, such personnel
would have all the rights and liabilities of combatants. They could
be attacked in retaliation like any other military personnel and
could be able to achieve prisoner of war status. Again, the
situation becomes more problematic when the technicians that act
for the nation or military are not incorporated into the armed
forces, but rather are simply computer-savvy civilians." 8
B. Defining Military Objectives
As mentioned above, in the context of military operations,
only military objectives may be directly attacked. The definition of
military objectives as provided in Additional Protocol I may be
considered a part of CIL. Under Article 52(2) of the Protocol,
"military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage."" 9 Military equipment and their
facilities, other than medical and religious structures, are cleardy
military objectives and, therefore, subject to direct cyber attacks. -
The problem arises, however, when dual-use objects, objects
that serve both military and civilian purposes such as airports and
bridges, are targeted. The source of the dilemma in clearly
defining military objectives versus non-military objectives is in
interpreting the terms found in Article 52 of Additional Protocol
I.121 Commentaries to the Protocol seem to define military
objectives more narrowly, stating that they are objects "directly
used by the armed forces," locations "of special importance for
military operations," and objects intended for use or being used
117. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 115, at 9.
118. Knut Dormann, Computer Network Attack and International Humanitarian Law
(May 19, 2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Cambridge Review of Int'l
Affairs "Internet and State Security Forum", available at
http://www.icrc.oig/web/eng/siteeng0.nsflhtml/5P2ALJ).
119. Additional Protocol I, supra note 64, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27.
120. Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 380; APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS, supra note 73, at 5-6.
121. See Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 380, 384-85.
[Vol. 32:303322
The Era of Cyber Warfare
122
for military purposes. In contrast, nations like the United States
take a more expansive approach by including economic targets as
military objectives. 2 3
Essentially, once the determination is made whether a cyber
attack caused injury, death, damage or destruction, opinions will
likely differ on whether the intended target was a civilian or
military object. Chances are that if the attack results in none of the
aforementioned consequences, the fact that a civilian object was
targeted will probably be of little concern. This again underscores
why the results of a cyber attack are central to the legal analysis.
C. The Attacks on Georgian Websites Likely Do Not Amount to an
Instance of Armed Conflict, Such That IHL Governs
Assuming that Russia was responsible for the cyber attacks
on Georgia, the next question must be whether IHL governs this
conflict. While the cyber attacks on Georgia appeared to
eventually be part of a classic conflict in which the Russian military
later invaded Georgia, the cyber conflict itself did not result in the
kinds of consequences necessary to rise to the level of an armed
conflict. As previously mentioned, during the cyber conflict, major
Georgian servers were brought down, resulting in confusion
124throughout the country and hindering communication. An
argument could be made, perhaps, that damage or destruction was
done to Georgian property, even if death or injury did not occur.
Nevertheless, because it appears that the main results of the
Georgian. attacks were confusion and inconvenience, the attacks
were thus permissible, regardless of whether the targets were
deemed military or non-military objectives.'
Even so, cyber attacks that result in confusion,
miscommunication, or the temporary shutdown of networks are
serious problems, and can be harmful to countries that rely heavily
on the Internet. Furthermore, it is entirely possible for the
shutdown of a nation's major websites to lead to far greater
consequences.
Because investigators in one country do not ordinarily have
the authority to cross international borders, the investigation into
122. Id. at 380.
123. Id. at 380-81.
124. See Hart, supra note 3, at D1.
125. See Wired Warfare, supra note 27, at 380-81.
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the source of a cyber attack is often difficult. Law enforcement or
national security personnel cannot unilaterally pursue
.r26investigations into networks located in other countries. Just as it
is difficult to determine who conducted a cyber attack, it is equally
difficult to determine what a permissible retaliatory response to
this kind of attack is, especially when the attack inflicts minimal
damage. In the absence of death or widespread destruction,
whether the international community would consider a
conventional military. attack a proportionate response is
questionable.12 For example, although the United States
recognizes that initial patterns of attack or infiltration can rise to
the level of an armed attack, it takes the position that reprisals
involving armed conflict or the use of force are illegal. The United
States thus justifies a responsive use of force in the exercise of the
right of self-defense. 1 2 Some also argue that cyber attacks require
an expansion of the definition of the use of force, such that there
129would be greater permissible responses through self-defense.
But expanding the definition in order to create greater conflict is
not necessary and does not serve any legitimate purpose,
particularly when the initial attack does not result in widespread
destruction or loss of life. Moreover, legal developments in this
area should move in the direction of narrowing the permissible
causes for armed conflict, not enlarging them.
The 2008 Russian-Georgian cyber conflict provides a good
example of how the many uncertainties and novelties of cyber
warfare make the application of IHL difficult in certain instances.
It is especially hard when determining responsibility for attacks or
clearly defining the distinction between military and non-military
objectives. An analysis of the Georgian attacks is meant to
highlight the types of issues that arise when applying IHL to such
conduct. This does not mean that IHL is not the proper regime to
126. BRYAN W. ELLIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND
LIMITATIONS OF INFORMATION WARFARE: WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS?, USAWC
STRATEGY . RESEARCH PROJECT 9 (2001), available at
http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/iwlaw/EllisBW-01.pdf.
127. Id. at 12. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-Fly
Zone Rules of Engagement, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 727, 754 (1998) (stating
that an act in self-defense must be characterized by necessity and proportionality).
128. ELLIS, supra note 126, at 12.
129. See Sinks, supra note 26, at 20.
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deal with cyber attacks in the future. 30 Rather, it underscores the
continued work that must be done by the international community
in the upcoming years to more clearly define certain terms and to
set forth more transparent policies. What is clear, however, is that
cyber attacks should only be undertaken in a way that respects
international law principles.
V. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND POWERFUL STATES
MUST SET FORTH MORE EXPLICIT AND TRANSPARENT POLICIES
REGARDING CYBER WARFARE ISSUES IN ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT
EXISTING IHL PRINCIPLES
Existing principles governing the law of war need not be
abandoned in the era of modern warfare. Rather, existing rules
and mechanisms simply need to be applied in novel ways and old
tenets of warfare must be rethought. The challenges, as well as the
opportunities, of cyber warfare need to be better understood, and
its laws and procedures need to be updated to accommodate the
changes in global technology. Over the past few years, some states
and international organizations have devoted considerable effort
to devise and implement preventative measures aimed at ensuring
better compliance with IHL in the event of a cyber attack.
Expert seminars have been assembled to discuss various ideas and
proposals, particularly through the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC). 2 Many participants have acknowledged a
positive obligation on states not involved in' an armed conflict to
take action against states that are violating IHL, particularly by
using their influences to stop the violations.
Some argue that a new international accord or treaty must be
created in order to deal specifically with cyber warfare. 34 The
rationale is that the Internet takes advantage of legal loopholes.
where state and non-state actors can ignore traditional Western
notions of war as described by IHL and, therefore, more
international laws are needed to apply directly to cyberspace."'
130. Contra . Shackelford, supra note 35, at 7 ("[T]he best way to ensure a
comprehensive regime is through a new international accord dealing exclusively with
cyber security and its status in international law.").
131. See INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 115, at 20.
132. Id. at 21.
133. Id. at 22.
134. See Shackelford, supra note 35, at 7.
135. See id. at 75-77.
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International treaties, however, would not offer any real
alternative to developing and continuing the dialogue among
nations, and would likely complicate the issues at stake.136 While
technological improvements and transparent policies can help
nations deal with the attribution problem, there still must be
greater discourse regarding cyber warfare issues in order to clear
up existing ambiguities.' Cyber warfare, if properly limited, may
allow militaries to act on an expanded list of targets while also
avoiding the loss of civilian lives.18 In other words, cyber warfare
could play an important niche role, by supplementing or
amplifying more traditional forms of warfare.
International organizations and states should continue their
open dialogue regarding cyber warfare issues and should strive for
transparency in their policies, such that there are clear
international guidelines for how states can permissibly use
computers to carry out attacks either independently or part and
parcel of a traditional armed conflict. The international legal
community must extend the existing IHL framework to apply to
cyber warfare, and states must evolve new norms in the form of
custom or codification based on experience."'
A. The Role of International Organizations
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a
specialized intergovernmental organization with state members
and private organizational members.140 Founded in 1865, it is now
a constituent part of the UN. While the ITU's main purpose is
adopting international regulations governing the electromagnetic
frequency spectrum, the organization's agenda also includes
developing a global information infrastructure. 14 1 In developing
standards for online security and digital certificates, the ITU could
also attempt to establish standards dealing with cyber attacks and
information warfare. Regulations promulgated under the ITU
136. See Kelsey, supra note 39, at 1449-50 (noting that the creation and enforcement of
a new treaty for cyber warfare would prove to be difficult).
137. See id. at 1449. See generally Shackelford, supra note 35, at 49-54 (discussing
attribution and state responsibility for cyber attacks).
138. Kelsey, supra note 39, at 1448.
139. Id. at 1449.
140. See Int'l Telecomm. Union, http://www.itu.int/net/about/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2010).
141. GERALD R. FERRERA ET AL., CYBERLAW: TEXT AND CASES 337-38 (2001).
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have some applicability to cyber attacks if they involve use of the
electromagnetic spectrum or international telecommunications
networks. However, the ITU would likely have little effect, even
in peacetime, because a violation of ITU rules has few
repercussions. Even if there were stiffer repercussions, a country
might still decide that these consequences would not outweigh its
143need to conduct operations against a particular adversary.
Because of the importance of satellites for international
telecommunications, as well as for military command, control, and
intelligence, some forms of cyber warfare may involve orbital
assets and, thus, implicate the ITU and other telecommunication
regulators. 44 Despite these concerns, the work of the ITU could
still prove to be valuable in increasing international dialogue
regarding cyber warfare issues, particularly through the ITU's
Global Cybersecurity Agenda, which works on coordinating
responses to cyber attacks.
The European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA) was created in 2004 as a response to concerns about
116
cyber security throughout the European Union.14 Most of the
efforts by the European Commission have resulted in creating
technical standards specifically with regard to Internet governance,
as opposed to supplementing international law norms. ENISA has,
however, recognized the complexity of the technological
environment and the' threat posed by cyber attacks against
electronic communications networks on the availability and
integrity of the information accessed through these networks,
creating a high-risk situation. 14 Similarly, an Asian regional forum,
the Telecommunications and Information Working Group of the
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, has also promoted regional
cooperation in fighting cyber attacks and terrorist misuse of cyber
142. ELLIS, supra note 126, at 3-4.
143. Id. at 4.
144. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 75, at 8; see also FERRERA ET AL., supra note
141, at 337-38.
145. Int'l Telecomm. Union, Global Strategy for Action and the Role of ITU,
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/strategy/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
146. See European Parliament and Council Regulation 460/04, Establishing the
European Network and Information Security Agency, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 77) 1.
147. See JANI ARNELL, EUROPEAN NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY (ENISA),
CURRENT SECURITY TRENDS 4 (2006).
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space.14 Other Asian countries are also looking to bolster cyber
defenses. The Malaysian government supported the establishment
of the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-
Terrorism, or IMPACT, in May 2008.4 IMPACT is focused
mostly on the "'upper end of cyber threats"' or attacks that would
damage a nation's critical infrastructure, such as air traffic
control.so It is clear that individual nations or governments cannot
address cyber warfare issues alone; international cooperation is
required. The aforementioned organizations recognize the
difficulties in applying IHL principles to cyber attacks, but are
working to establish clearer policies on which nations can rely.
As mentioned earlier, a major concern is the ability to
attribute a cyber attack to a particular government entity because,
although an IP address can be tracked, it does not necessarily
mean that a military or government official is behind the
keyboard. In the near future, however, Internet anonymity may be
lessened thus making it easier to trace the source of cyber
attacks. The UN National Security Agency has been
participating in the "IP Traceback" drafting group since the fall of
2008. But this proposal has raised concerns among a number of
international organizations. While the upshot of this may be that
governments will be able to more effectively track cyber attacks to
the source, it is also likely that this type of capability could be
misused. Some people believe that traceback mechanisms will no
longer serve much of a purpose because there are too many
sources in a DDoS attack to be useful, and the source computer
154was, in many cases, hacked in the first place.
While the UN has no power to impose Internet standards on
the world, it has been lobbying for more influence over the way
148. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Telecommunications and Information
Working Group, http://www.apec.org/apec/apec-groups/som-committee-on_economic/
workinggroups/telecommunications-andinformation.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
149. Jason Miks, Asian Countries Look to Bolster Cyber Defenses, WORLD POLITICS
REVIEW, Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2576.
150. Id. (quoting the chairman of IMPACT's management board).
151. Id.
152. See Declan McCullagh, U.N. Agency Eyes Curbs on Internet Anonymity, CNET
NEWS, Sept. 12, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10040152-38.html.
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155. Id. Internet addressing is under the control of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private not-for-profit California corporation.
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the Internet is managed, most prominently through the World
Summit on the Information Society. Still, it is unlikely that any
sort of mandatory IP Traceback or authentication regime will or
could be imposed by national governments or international bodies.
While international organizations should continue to advocate
transparent policies on cyber warfare in order to assist states,
resorting to over-management of the Internet is not the right
solution.
B. States Should Develop Clearly Defined Cyber Strategies and
Comprehensive Government-Network Defenses
The conduct and practices of states are itself a major source
of CIL and would assist in supplementing conventional norms
regarding the law of war and its application to cyber warfare.
Particularly, China and the United States serve as examples of
states working to establish strong national policies on cyber
attacks.
The Chinese military and nationally supported groups have
prepared detailed plans regarding cyber attacks as a way to
achieve electronic dominance. 'China's ambitions extend to
crippling an enemy's financial, military, and communications
capabilities early in conflict, and there is evidence to indicate that
China regards offensive computer operations as essential to taking
control in the first stages of war.18 Furthermore, China has
developed viruses to attack enemy computers and has even
recently hacked into the White House computer network. 59 While
these plans may raise numerous concerns for other nations,
China's push to make cyber warfare an integral part of their
national army is prudent. The sooner states embrace the concept
of cyber warfare, the sooner IHL ambiguities can be resolved.
Engineering standards are set by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), both of which are voluntary industry organizations.
These private agencies have no regulatory power per se, but set standards that de facto
control the Internet. WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, BACKGROUND
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2005), available at
http://www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.pdf.
156. McCullagh, supra note 152.
157. Tim Reid, China's Cyber Army is Preparing to March on America, Says
Pentagon, TIMES (London), Sept. 8, 2007, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/tech-and-web/the-web/article2409865.ece.
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Because cyber attacks are not going to disappear, it is better that
states establish clear national policies, such that the rest of the
international community can follow suit.
The United States has become increasingly concerned about
the threats of cyber attacks. In recent years, there have been a
series of cyber attacks on military and homeland security computer
networks in the United States, many of which have been traced
160back to China. Presumably as a way to deal with these dangers,
the United States has developed cyber warfare contingency plans
under the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 16,
which was implemented in 2002. 16 The directive, however, has
remained classified and, therefore, does little to deter potential
enemies. Nevertheless, this directive apparently ordered the
development of guidelines to regulate the use of cyber weapons in
war. Additionally, NSPD 16 instituted strict rules of engagement
requiring "top-level" approval for any such attack.162 Some people
in the United States believe that the nation needs to do more to
develop an offensive cyber war capability, similar to that of
China. In all reality, nations will probably not be able to develop
a complete military offensive until there is further clarity in
determining the attribution of attacks. Furthermore, the lines
164separating crime, terrorism, and warfare are often hard to draw.
Nevertheless, the United States is taking action by attempting to
develop and sustain a cyber-force with personnel trained in
conducting cyber warfare. More nations should seek to develop
transparent standards regarding cyber attacks so that the law can
continue to develop and nations can better understand how
respond to such attacks.
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ECONOMIC ALERT, Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.americaneconomicalert.org/
view art.asp?ProdID=2873.
161. Bradley Graham, Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare: Rules for Attacking
Enemy Computers Prepared as U.S. Weighs Iraq Options, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2003, at
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C. The Future of Cyber Warfare: The Cyber Defense Era
The near future of cyber warfare will likely resemble that of
nuclear defense, in which the growing trend will be for nations to
set up cyber defense systems as a way to deter cyber attacks by
other nations. Recently, seven NATO countries backed the
establishment of a new cyber warfare defense center in Estonia.16
The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
(CCDCOE) began operations in the Fall of 2008, and conducts
research and training in cyber warfare.16 -A large portion of the
CCDCOE's staff are specialists from the sponsoring countries,
Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Spain,
and the United States has agreed to send an observer. In June
2009, the CCDCOE held a Conference on Cyber Warfare to
discuss definitions of cyber warfare and the enhancement of cyber
defense capabilities. 169
In the near future, there will likely be greater adoption of
counter-strategies by states in order to deflect radicalization that is
used for inciting violence or attacking enemy infrastructures over
the Internet. These strategies might include open-source
intelligence gathering and infiltration efforts."o In addition, nations
may also seek to take advantage of opportunities to use offensive
information operations to achieve specific outcomes, including
operations to undermine group cohesion and to interfere with
decision-making, or to constrain terrorist activities in order to
preempt attacks."' The reason for this is that reactive defense is
172not very effective against increasingly powerful cyber attacks.
Thus, more effective defense measures should incorporate
173predictive, active, and preemptive elements.
The United States, through the Department of Defense
(DOD), has also created a program known as Computer Network
166. John Leyden, NATO Primes Cyber Defence Centre in Estonia, THE REGISTER,
May 15, 2008, http://theregister.co.uk/2008/05/15/nato-Cyber-defencecentre/.
167. Id.; Press Release, Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Minister
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Defense (CND), which describes activities that are designed to
protect U.S. forces against information operational attacks from
174adversaries. CND is defined as "defensive measures to protect
information, computers, and networks from disruption or
destruction."' While acknowledging that a legal review of cyber
warfare issues is necessary, the DOD has also pushed for the
recruitment of cyber warriors as part of the armed forces.17 This is
a pragmatic approach because it would help solve' the attribution
problem that often creates difficulties in applying IHL to cyber
attacks. Additionally, more nations will likely follow the United
States' lead by creating these kinds of defense mechanisms in the
near future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cyberspace has been in existence for a number of years, but
government entities are increasingly taking advantage of this
domain as a way to carry out various kinds of war-like attacks with
the help of computers. This raises many concerns, given that
major aspects of a nation's critical or physical infrastructure are
177connected to cyberspace.
This article has shown that international laws that are
currently in place do address the ever-changing nature of warfare.
The Geneva Conventions, as well as. the IHL principles of
proportionality and unnecessary suffering, all provide a framework
for addressing cyber warfare issues. The international legal
community, however, must continue to work to address certain
ambiguities that exist in applying IHL so that nations have a clear
understanding as to how to go about carrying out or defending
against a cyber attack. The key for states and international
organizations in the upcoming years is to find better, more
efficient ways to determine who is responsible for particular cyber
attacks and to establish more transparent national policies
regarding evolving cyber warfare issues. Although cyber attacks
are usually not immediately directed at human beings, they do
have the potential to indirectly cause severe injuries or even
174. Id. at 2.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id. at 12.
177. Solce, supra note 22, at 302.
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death. The effects of a cyber attack will determine whether it is
classified as an armed conflict for purposes of IHL. Additionally,
the outcome of the attack will drive the victim-nation's response.
Science fiction literature and film are replete with future wars
in which enemy nations or worlds disrupt civilian and military
communications networks as a way to gain military and economic
control. Except that this is no longer science fiction. As early as
2001, it was recognized by the international community that cyber
warfare would be a major threat in the future.8
As expected, there are competing theories for how to best
handle these changes in war tactics. Some advocate that a nation's
military should actually create a "Cyber Force" that focuses
entirely on cyber attacks."' Others argue that cyber attacks only
produce a limited breadth of damage and, therefore, are not a
major threat such that there should be international legal
concerns.182 Nevertheless, the unpredictable consequences and
unexpected adversarial advantages that stem from a cyber attack
can be just as destructive and damaging as a physical attack.
Accordingly, states and international organizations must take
proactive stances toward establishing national cyber security
strategies and adhering to international legal norms, with the
recognition that cyber warfare is here to stay.
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